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In light of Judge Mannheimer’s lengthy dissent in Wilson v. State 
regarding the 1994 amendment to article I, section 19 of the Alaska 
Constitution, this Note takes an in-depth look at the history of that 
amendment. The amendment clearly established an individual right 
to bear arms for Alaska citizens, but Judge Mannheimer interpreted 
it as also requiring courts to implement strict scrutiny when 
reviewing the constitutionality of firearm prohibitions. This Note 
thoroughly examines the legislative history of the amendment and 
the 1994 election pamphlet to determine whether felon-in-possession 
laws should be subjected to strict scrutiny review. While the 
legislative history did leave the door open to a higher standard of 
review for felon-in-possession statutes, the court of appeals firmly 
shut that through its post-1994 rulings.  This Note argues that the 
court has correctly applied the legislative intent, and the principle of 
stare decisis was correctly utilized in Wilson v. State to forego 
application of strict scrutiny. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, the voters of Alaska approved an amendment to article I, 
section 19 of the Alaska Constitution.1 The amendment states: “The 
individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed 
by the State or a political subdivision of the State.”2 Over the next fifteen 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law (2011). B.S. Economics 
and B.S. Psychology, University of Florida (2008). 
 1. See 1994 General Election Official Results, Statewide Summary, November 8, 
1994, STATE OF ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.alaska.gov/ 
results/94GENR/result94.htm#bal 1 (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). The amendment 
passed by a margin of 153,300 to 57,636. Id. 
 2. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19. 
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years, three Alaska cases interpreted this amendment, and all three 
reached the same conclusion: the amendment guarantees an individual 
right to bear arms but still allows the legislature to promulgate firearm 
restrictions for certain dangerous classes regardless of whether such 
restrictions are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government 
interest.3 In 2009, the Alaska Court of Appeals addressed this issue for a 
fourth time in Wilson v. State.4 This case marked the first opportunity for 
the court to construe article I, section 19 since the United States Supreme 
Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller5 that the Second Amendment 
of the United States Constitution protects an individual right to bear 
arms apart from any militia service.6 
In Wilson, Allen Wilson was found in possession of a loaded 
handgun after being pulled over for a traffic violation.7 Since he had 
previously been convicted of a felony, Wilson was charged with 
violating section 11.61.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes.8 This provision 
states that “[a] person commits the crime of misconduct involving 
weapons in the third degree if the person . . . knowingly possesses a 
firearm capable of being concealed on one’s person after having been 
convicted of a felony.”9 At trial, Wilson asserted that this statute was 
unconstitutional under the 1994 amendment to article I, section 19 
because it did not distinguish between violent and non-violent prior 
felonies.10 The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, and Wilson was 
convicted.11 
Wilson raised the same issue on appeal, and the court of appeals 
disagreed with Wilson and affirmed the conviction.12 Chief Judge Coats 
authored the opinion and relied heavily on the court’s prior decision in 
Gibson v. State,13 which concluded that the legislative history and voter 
intent of the 1994 amendment demonstrated that certain restrictions, 
such as prohibiting felons and intoxicated citizens from possessing 
 
 3. See DeMars v. State, Nos. A-7002, 4100, 1999 WL 652444, at *2 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Aug. 18, 1999); Morgan v. State, 943 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997); 
Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1301–03 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 4. 207 P.3d 565 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009). 
 5. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 6. Id. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and 
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and 
bear arms.”). 
 7. Wilson, 207 P.3d at 566. 
 8. Id. 
 9. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(a)(1) (2010). 
 10. See Wilson, 207 P.3d at 566. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 930 P.2d 1300 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
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firearms, should not be invalidated by the amendment.14 He also 
referenced District of Columbia v. Heller15 in order to demonstrate the 
United States Supreme Court’s view that even though individuals have 
a right to bear arms under the Second Amendment (which at the time of 
Gibson had not yet been incorporated against the states16), the right is not 
absolute with regard to convicted felons.17 
Judge Stewart wrote a concurring opinion that supported Chief 
Judge Coats’ conclusion by noting the value of common sense and stare 
decisis.18 Judge Stewart appropriately interpreted the 1994 amendment 
in light of the Alaska Supreme Court’s guidance regarding 
constitutional interpretation. He announced that appellate courts should 
apply independent judgment to questions of constitutional law and give 
constitutional provisions “a reasonable and practical interpretation in 
accordance with common sense.”19 Additionally, the proper review 
requires that courts “look to the plain meaning and purpose of the 
provision and the intent of the framers.”20 Judge Stewart immediately 
applied these standards to decipher the intent of the voters because they 
had been the ones ultimately responsible for approving the 
amendment.21 Indeed, a key aspect of his analysis is its practical focus. 
Judge Stewart pointed out that most citizens were likely not aware of 
the standard of review that applied to firearm restrictions,22 nor that the 
adoption of this amendment could implicate the standard.23 Neither the 
election pamphlet nor the ballot made any reference to a standard of 
review.24 Not even the neutral opinion of the Legislative Affairs Agency 
 
 14. See Wilson, 207 P.3d at 567–68. 
 15. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 16. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding 
that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the states).  Interestingly, the 
Court explicitly reaffirmed its statement in Heller that the holding should “not 
cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.’” Id. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 
554 U.S. at 626). 
 17. Wilson, 207 P.3d at 566–67; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Heller is a 
federal case and thus is not a source of binding precedent for Alaska courts 
interpreting the Alaska Constitution. The reference by Chief Judge Coats, 
though, is beneficial for a broader perspective of the issue and as a general 
justification for a state’s ability to place some limitations on the right to bear 
arms. 
 18. Wilson, 207 P.3d at 569–70 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 19. Id. at 569 (quoting Arco Alaska, Inc. v. State, 824 P.2d 708, 710 (Alaska 
1992)). 
 20. Id. (quoting Arco Alaska, 824 P.2d at 710). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
     23.   See id. 
 24. See id. at 583–86 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting). 
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made any mention of a potential change to it.25 Accordingly, Judge 
Stewart came to the conclusion that the 1994 amendment did not require 
the court to use strict scrutiny review in felon-in-possession cases.26 
In response to the majority’s short and seemingly straightforward 
decision, Judge Mannheimer penned a twenty-four-page dissent 
thoroughly analyzing the legislative history of the 1994 amendment. He 
passionately and persuasively argued that the Legislature intended to 
apply strict scrutiny to firearm regulations.  This Note aims to 
demonstrate that the only aspect of the resolution that is binding on the 
courts is its adoption of an individual right to bear arms. The committee 
meetings are replete with legislators stating that the purpose of the 
amendment is to guarantee an individual right to bear arms.27 Similarly, 
the plain meaning of the amendment demonstrates an intent to clarify 
that article I, section 19 grants an individual right rather than a collective 
right. The legislature specifically began the amendment with the phrase 
“[t]he individual right.” 
In light of Judge Mannheimer’s forceful dissent regarding the need 
for strict scrutiny, this Note will evaluate the court’s current approach to 
the level of review for firearm cases.28 It will argue that the court in 
Gibson opened the door to implementing a heightened standard of 
review for felon-in-possession laws because of its unique opportunity to 
analyze them in connection with privacy claims under article I, section 
 
 25. See id. at 583. 
 26. See id. at 569 (Steward, J., concurring). 
 27. See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM., Jan. 21, 1994, 18th Leg., 
Tape 94-3, Side A at no. 142, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_single_minute.asp?house=S&session=18&comm=STA&date=19940121&tim
e=0905 (statement of Chairman Leman). 
 28. The Author agrees with Judge Mannheimer that the Legislature cannot 
make conclusive findings on whether a law passes constitutional muster. See 
Wilson, 207 P.3d at 590 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting) (“The courts are not bound 
by either legislators’ or voters’ predictions of how an amended constitutional 
provision will be interpreted and applied—unless that ‘prediction’ is actually 
codified in the amendment itself.”). However, the Author also notes that the 
Legislature cannot unilaterally establish the level of scrutiny for the court to use. 
In Alaska, the supreme court applies its own “independent judgment to 
questions of constitutional law and review[s] de novo the construction of the 
Alaska and federal Constitutions.” Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz, 
170 P.3d 183, 189 (Alaska 2007); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) 
(establishing the process of judicial review); David L. Faigman, Amicus Brief of 
Constitutional Law Professors David L. Faigman and Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, et al., in 
the Case of Gonzales v. Carhart, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 71 (2006) (noting that 
the Court has a “constitutional obligation to exercise its own independent legal 
judgment” and that by relying entirely on the Legislature’s choices, courts 
would “ignore these well-settled constitutional principles and would have the 
legislative fox guarding the constitutional henhouse”). 
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22 of the Alaska Constitution.29 In privacy cases, the court either applies 
a “compelling interest” test30 or intermediate scrutiny31 depending on 
whether the individual has a fundamental right and whether the 
individual’s action “interferes in a serious manner with the health, 
safety, rights and privileges of others or with the public welfare.”32 
Through independent analysis of the legislative history and prior 
cases, this Note aims to demonstrate that the Alaska courts have been 
correctly interpreting article I, section 19 of the Alaska Constitution by 
eschewing strict scrutiny when reviewing constitutional challenges to 
felon-in-possession statutes. The legislative history of section 19, as well 
as its interpretation by the Alaska courts, demonstrates that at most the 
proper standard is a level of review that requires a “close and 
substantial relationship” to a legitimate government interest. This 
standard satisfies Alaska’s desire for strong protections against 
government intrusions,33 but it still allows statutes that prohibit firearm 
possession by felons.  
Part I of this Note begins by reviewing the history of article I, 
section 19 of the Alaska Constitution and its similarities to the Second 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This portion next conducts a 
thorough examination of the legislative history of the 1994 amendment, 
which reveals a legislative intent to clarify an individual right to bear 
arms and to retain restrictions for convicted felons. The Note then 
assesses the effect of the election pamphlet given to voters in the 1994 
election. Part I.D looks at the three pre-Wilson cases that addressed 
section 19 claims in the aftermath of the 1994 amendment. Lastly, Part II 
of the Note contends that even if an argument could be made for 
implementing strict scrutiny, stare decisis requires that the courts 
 
 29. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (explicitly guaranteeing the right to privacy 
in Alaska). 
 30. Strict scrutiny in this context requires that the “constraints are justified 
by a compelling state interest, and no less restrictive means could advance that 
interest.” See, e.g., Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 
969 (Alaska 1997). 
 31. Intermediate scrutiny in this context requires that legislation bear a 
“close and substantial relationship” to a “legitimate state interest.” Ravin v. 
State, 537 P.2d 494, 506 (Alaska 1975). 
 32. Compare Valley Hosp. Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 969 (applying strict scrutiny to a 
woman’s fundamental right to reproductive choice), with Ravin, 537 P.2d at 506 
(applying intermediate scrutiny when defendant had no fundamental right to 
possess marijuana and his action might interfere “in a serious manner with the 
health, safety, rights and privileges of others or with the public welfare”). 
 33. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 515–16 (Boochever, J., concurring) (affirmatively 
stating that the test employed in Ravin is a departure from the two-tier strict 
scrutiny/rational basis model and that it implements a balancing test that 
explicitly rejects looking for a mere rational basis). 
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continue utilizing a lower standard of review when considering felon-in-
possession firearm challenges. 
I. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
A. General Background of Article I, Section 19 
In 1955, four years before Alaska became a state, delegates from 
across the territory convened in Fairbanks to craft a constitution that 
would bolster their case for statehood.34 The delegates chose to use the 
United States Constitution as a framework with the idea that by 
mirroring the U.S. Constitution, their chances for being granted 
statehood would increase substantially.35 In fact, many sections of the 
Alaska Constitution use wording almost identical to that found in the 
U.S. Constitution.36 One such provision is section 19 of article I, which 
states “A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free 
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed.”37 This controversial clause closely tracks the Second 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the meaning of which has been 
heavily debated for many years. 
Currently, the ultimate meaning of the Second Amendment is 
becoming clearer.38 Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in 
Heller and McDonald, though, there was no definitive answer to whether 
the amendment provided a “collective” right—one connected to service 
in a militia—or an “individual” right—one that was not militia-related.39 
 
 34. GORDON S. HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, ALASKA'S 
CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE 3 (4th ed. 2002), available at http:// 
w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/citizens_guide.pdf. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4 (“No law shall be made respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”); cf. U.S. 
CONST. amend. I (using identical language). 
 37. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 38. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (announcing 
that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms); see 
also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (announcing that 
the Second Amendment is applicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 39. Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 597, 597–600 (2006) (stating that the debate regarding the Second 
Amendment has been almost entirely focused on whether it protects an 
individual or collective right). Winkler defines the individual versus collective 
argument as a “first-order” question, while noting the debate regarding 
standard of review is merely a “second-order” question that has unanimously 
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As federal case law developed, it became apparent that the prevailing 
opinion was that the Second Amendment provided only a collective 
right to bear arms.40 In response, many states began amending their 
constitutions to clarify that their “right to bear arms” provisions were 
intended to create an individual right.41 The Alaska Legislature had 
attempted to add a similar provision repeatedly, but the proposals never 
made it out of the Legislature.42 In 1994, however, Alaska finally joined 
these other states by amending article I, section 19 of its constitution.43 
The amendment added the sentence: “The individual right to keep and 
 
been decided in favor of deferential scrutiny. Id. at 597–98. Winkler’s conclusion 
was that even if the Second Amendment was construed to give rise to an 
individual right, it would be mainly symbolic and would not affect most firearm 
restrictions. Id. at 613. 
 40. See United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019–20 (8th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Warin, 530 
F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921–23 (1st Cir. 
1942). Following the 1994 amendment to the Alaska Constitution, the trend grew 
stronger as even more circuits adopted the collective right interpretation of the 
Second Amendment. See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); Love v. 
Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995). Most importantly, though, was the 
1996 decision supporting a collective right in the Ninth Circuit. See Hickman v. 
Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101–02 (9th Cir. 1996) (expressly establishing that the Second 
Amendment only guarantees a collective right). See generally Roger I. Roots, The 
Approaching Death of the Collective Right Theory of the Second Amendment, 39 DUQ. 
L. REV. 71, 77–78 (2000) (explaining which circuits emphasized that the Second 
Amendment guaranteed a collective right rather than an individual right to bear 
arms). 
 41. See Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional 
Politics of Gun Control, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 715, 736–39 (2005) (detailing other 
states’ movements to amend their constitutions to include or clarify an 
individual right to bear arms). Prior to Alaska’s amendment in 1994, Nebraska 
(in 1988) and Maine (in 1987) each passed amendments to assure their citizens 
that the right to bear arms was individual rather than collective. Id. at 736. More 
importantly, Utah enacted a similar amendment in 1984 to guarantee an 
individual right. Id. at 738–39. Utah’s amendment is especially apropos because 
its original language used the term “people” similar to the U.S. Constitution and 
the Alaska Constitution. Id. In 1984, though, the state eliminated the ambiguity 
by explicitly using the term “individual right.” Id. at 739. 
 42. See MINUTES OF THE S. FIN. COMM., Feb. 15, 1994, 18th Leg., Tape SFC-94, 
No. 25, Side 1, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_single_minute.asp?house=S&session=18&comm=FIN&date=19940215&time
=0920 (statement of Co-Chairman Frank) (mentioning that amendments had 
been suggested in past years). 
 43. To amend the Alaska Constitution, a proposed amendment must pass 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives by a two-thirds vote. After the 
amendment passes the Legislature, it is placed on the general election ballot. If it 
receives more than fifty percent of the vote, the amendment is enacted. ALASKA 
CONST. art. XIII, § 1. Additionally, when the amendment is placed on the ballot, 
it must be presented with a summary prepared by the lieutenant governor. Id. 
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bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the State or a political 
subdivision of the State.”44 
B. Legislative History of the 1994 Amendment 
1. Senate State Affairs Committee 
The 1994 amendment began its journey through the Alaska 
Legislature as Senate Joint Resolution 39 (SJR 39). The first public 
hearing on the resolution was held on January 21, 1994, in the Senate 
State Affairs Committee.45 The summary for the resolution notes that “in 
addition to the right of the people to keep and bear arms as approved by 
the voters at the time of ratification of the state Constitution, . . . the 
individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or 
infringed.”46 This summary mentions specifically that the amendment 
aims to establish an individual right for the citizens of Alaska.47 But 
nowhere in the summary is there any mention of a strict scrutiny 
standard or indeed of any standard of review. 
The first witness to testify at the hearing on the amendment was 
Duane Udland, the Deputy Chief of Police for the Anchorage Police 
Department.48 He noted that there was concern that the new amendment 
would jeopardize the government’s ability to pass reasonable firearm 
restrictions.49 However, as soon as Udland voiced this concern, the 
chairman of the committee asked Portia Babcock, the Senate State 
Affairs Committee legislative aide, to give an overview of the 
amendment.50 And in response, Babcock announced that the purpose of 
the Amendment was to “protect and insure [sic] the right to keep and 
bear arms in the future.”51 
Following Babcock’s remarks, Senator Dave Donley noted his belief 
that “the proper judicial standard of review in terms of balancing 
firearms rights of individuals versus the protection of society[] is a 
compelling public safety interest standard.”52 Later in the hearing, after 
 
 44. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19. 
 45. See MINUTES OF THE S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM., supra note 27, Tape 94-2, Side 
B at no. 483 (statement of Chairman Leman). 
 46. See MINUTES OF THE S. FIN. COMM., supra note 42. This summary was 
identical for each committee and never once mentioned a level of judicial 
scrutiny. See, e.g., id. 
 47. See MINUTES OF THE S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM., supra note 27, Tape 94-2, Side 
B at no. 483. 
 48. Id. at no. 463 (statement of Duane Udland). 
 49. Id. at no. 425. 
 50. Id. at no. 285 (statement of Chairman Leman). 
 51. Id. at no. 273 (statement of Portia Babcock). 
 52. Id. at no. 218 (statement of Senator Donley). 
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Senator Loren Leman had advised a citizen that “SJR 39 will not restrict 
municipalities from dealing with appropriate local restrictions on 
firearms,” Senator Robin Taylor echoed Senator Donley’s comments 
regarding standard of review.53 Senator Taylor expressed that “it is the 
intent of the committee that a standard of compelling public safety 
interest will allow municipalities and the state to continue to pass laws 
regarding appropriate restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms.”54 
One must note that Senator Taylor went so far as to state that 
“appropriate” restrictions would still be allowed if SJR 39 passed.55 
Senator Leman also reiterated, “[I]t is not [my] intent to restrict the 
passage of laws regulating firearms where there is a concern of public 
safety.”56 Furthermore, Senator Leman believed SJR 39 was necessary to 
illuminate the meaning of article I, section 19 because of “concern that 
current constitutional law could be interpreted as a collective right to 
bear arms and not an individual right. This would clarify the right to 
keep and bear arms as an individual right.”57 
The hearing concluded with testimony from local individuals 
whose comments focused on the need to pass SJR 39 and the argument 
that all gun controls should be unconstitutional.58 Not one of these 
witnesses made reference to a heightened form of judicial review. For 
example, Dan Puritte stated, “the federal government is doing 
everything it can to take away our freedom, our rights, and our guns.”59 
This statement demonstrates the growing concern among Alaskans at 
the time that article I, section 19 could be viewed as protecting only a 
collective right. It was this fear that drove passage of the amendment—
not a desire to change the level of judicial scrutiny applied to firearm 
restrictions. After all the witnesses testified, SJR 39 was discharged from 
the Senate State Affairs Committee.60 
 
 53. Id. Tape 94-3, Side A at nos. 091–095 (statements of Chairman Leman and 
Senator Taylor). 
 54. Id. at no. 095 (statement of Senator Taylor). 
 55. Id. This is an example of the Legislature clearly stating its desire that 
certain prohibitions, such as those relating to felons in possession, be maintained 
even if merely “appropriate.”  This language suggests a standard of review 
much more relaxed than strict scrutiny. 
 56. Id. at no. 142 (statement of Chairman Leman). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 574 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009) 
(Mannheimer, J., dissenting) (listing three witnesses in order to demonstrate the 
public opinion regarding SJR 39). 
 59. See MINUTES OF THE S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM., supra note 27, Tape 94-2, Side 
B at no. 183 (statement of Dan Puritte). 
 60. Id. Tape 94-3, Side A at no. 180 (statement of Chairman Leman). 
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2. Senate Judiciary Committee 
SJR 39 then went to the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 4, 
1994.61 Senator Leman, the chair of the committee where the proposal 
was introduced, opened the discussion by reiterating that the 
amendment would not bar governmental bodies from passing firearm 
restrictions.62 Furthermore, he noted, “the consensus of his hearings was 
that any change to the constitution should be clear and as simple as 
possible.”63 Since the people of Alaska had growing concerns that article 
I, section 19 (a nearly exact replica of the Second Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution) was going to be construed as protecting only a collective 
right, they wanted to act quickly to cement their right to keep and bear 
arms as an individual one. Legislators likely feared that language 
implicating the standard of review would hinder the amendment’s 
successful passage on the ballot. 
Assistant Attorney General Dean Guaneli was the first witness to 
testify about SJR 39 at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing.64 Guaneli 
expressed concerns that SJR 39 could cause the courts to impose strict 
scrutiny and overturn existing laws such as the convicted-felon-in-
possession laws.65 Senator Leman, however, quashed this suggestion by 
stating “Mr. Guaneli’s fear of a clean constitutional amendment [i]s not 
founded in fact” and “appropriate restrictions [would still be valid after 
this amendment].”66 While it is true that Senator Donley then stated that 
the proper level of review should be strict scrutiny, he immediately 
undercut this statement by asserting that “the compelling public safety 
interest should be the test regarding whether laws are upheld or not; 
with firearms very few safety requirements are not reasonable.”67 
 
 61. Bill History/Action for 18 Legislature, Bill SJR 39, ALASKA STATE 
LEGISLATURE (May 27, 1994), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_complete_ 
bill.asp?session=18&bill=SJR39. 
 62. MINUTES OF THE S. JUDICIARY COMM., Feb. 4, 1994, 18th Leg., Tape 94-6, 
Side B at no. 523, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_ 
minute.asp?house=S&session=18&comm=JUD&date=19940204&time=1342 
(statement of Senator Leman). 
 63. Id. (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. (statement of Dean Guaneli). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at no. 240 (statement of Senator Leman). 
 67. Id. at no. 121 (statement of Senator Donley) (emphasis added). Senator 
Donley later weakened this position even further by submitting a letter of intent, 
which revealed that he had a standard other than strict scrutiny in mind for 
felon-in-possession challenges. See S. JOURNAL, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. 3032–34 
(Alaska 1994), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_ 
journal.asp?session=18&date=19940302&beg_page=3019&end_page=3049&cha
mber=S; see also infra Part I.B.4 (discussing Senator Donley’s letter of intent and 
how it demonstrates that he actually was referring to a lesser standard than 
strict scrutiny as courts apply it with regards to convicted felons). 
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After Portia Babcock testified that municipalities support SJR 3968 
and Senator Donley noted he would file a letter of intent regarding the 
standard of review for the proposed amendment,69 the Senate Judiciary 
Committee passed SJR 39.70 
3. Senate Finance Committee 
The next public discussion of the bill occurred in the Senate Finance 
Committee on February 15, 1994.71 Portia Babcock, aide to the Senate 
State Affairs Committee, again was asked to testify.72 She clearly stated 
that the resolution was intended “to better guarantee the individual 
right to keep and bear arms in the future for the state of Alaska.”73 She 
then went on to note that over “the past ten years this issue had come up 
and in polls taken it was estimated that [seventy-eight to ninety] percent 
of Alaskans supported this resolution . . . to better guarantee the 
individual right to keep and bear arms.”74 
It is particularly important to note the time period to which 
Babcock referred in her statements. The ten-year period preceding 1994 
was the time during which federal courts of appeal were creating 
precedent that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
protected a collective right rather than an individual right.75 And 
perhaps more importantly, this period came immediately after a 1983 
Alaska Attorney General opinion stated that article I, section 19 
conferred only a collective right to bear arms.76 Only after Babcock again 
mentioned the public support for an amendment to clarify an individual 
right did the topic of judicial review even come into play.77 Senator 
Steve Rieger questioned her regarding how it would affect current 
firearm restrictions and again Babcock (similar to Senator Leman) 
asserted that it was aimed only at “very unreasonable restrictions.”78 
Mr. Guaneli was also present at this meeting, and he repeated his 
concerns about SJR 39.79 He posited that some firearm restrictions might 
 
 68. MINUTES OF THE S. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 62, Tape 94-6, Side A at 
no. 200 (statement of Portia Babcock). 
 69. Id. at no. 250 (statement of Senator Donley). 
 70. Id. at no. 290 (statement of Senator Jacko). 
 71. MINUTES OF THE S. FIN. COMM., supra note 42. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  (statement of Portia Babcock). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See supra note 40. 
 76. See 2 Op. Att’y Gen. Alaska 1, 1983 Alas. AG Lexis 322, File No. 366-444-
83 (Alaska 1983). 
 77. See MINUTES OF THE S. FIN. COMM., supra note 42 (statement of Portia 
Babcock). 
 78. Id. (statement of Senator Rieger). 
 79. Id. (statement of Dean J. Guaneli). 
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be questioned under the amendment if there was no explicit provision 
stating that the current standard of review would remain applicable.80 
Guaneli later stated, however, that “this resolution did not give the court 
enough to go on for intent.”81 But again, when Guaneli raised these 
concerns, a senator immediately addressed his opinions. Senator Frank 
explained that he “did not see any heightened protection in this 
amendment but a clarification that it was an individual rather than a 
collective right.”82 Guaneli responded to this statement by noting that 
courts view changes to the constitution as an instruction that something 
has changed.83 Guaneli observed that the proposed amendment may 
indicate that “instead of a reasonable basis test, the Legislature wanted 
to apply some higher standard of scrutiny.”84 Seemingly in response to 
such concerns, Senator Donley produced a letter of intent regarding the 
proper standard of review.85 
4. Senate Floor 
The full Senate convened on March 2, 1994, to vote on SJR 39.86 At 
the beginning of this meeting, Senator Donley provided a letter of intent 
for SJR 39.87 It had three main points: (1) SJR 39 was not to be used to 
interfere with private conduct; (2) SJR 39 should be considered to 
implement a “legitimate and compelling governmental interest” 
standard to restrictions on firearm access; and (3) SJR 39 “does not 
 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. This comment was made in regard to a possible heightened scrutiny 
that may attach if rational basis was not expressly noted as the proper standard 
of review. 
 82. Id. (statement of Co-Chairman Frank). 
 83. Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 578 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009) (Mannheimer, J., 
dissenting). 
 84. MINUTES OF THE S. FIN. COMM., supra note 42 (statement of Dean J. 
Guaneli). 
 85. See S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3033. In Alaska, letters of intent written 
by legislators are relevant legislative history and can provide insight into the 
Legislature’s understanding of a bill. See LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY, 
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, GUIDE TO ALASKA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MATERIALS 3 
(2009), available at http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/leghistory/Legh.pdf. 
 86. S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3032. 
 87. Id. at 3032–34. The letter of intent was agreed to by a vote of fifteen to 
four, with Senator Jacko absent during the vote. Id. at 3035. SJR 39 was then 
voted on and passed by a fifteen to five margin that included Senator Jacko. Id. 
After the voting, Senator Duncan gave notice of reconsideration, and the final 
vote was held the next day on March 3, 1994. The letter of intent and SJR 39 were 
both passed by a vote of sixteen to three, with Senator Kelly being excused from 
voting. Id. at 3064–65, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_single_journal.asp?session=18&date=19940303&beg_page=3051&end_page=
3076&chamber=S. 
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prevent the legislature from limiting access and possession of arms by 
convicted felons and those convicted of crimes of violence.”88 
The letter of intent began by mentioning the distinct similarity 
between the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, 
section 19 of the Alaska Constitution.89 Next, Senator Donley expressed 
the intent to use a “legitimate and compelling governmental interest” 
standard to review constitutional challenges arising under SJR 39.90 
Noting the comparability between the wording of this amendment and 
the phrasing of article I, section 22 (which guarantees the right to 
privacy),91 Senator Donley argued that the standard of review used in 
cases under section 22 should be borrowed and made to apply to 
challenges to gun laws.92 Specifically, Senator Donley asserted that 
“interference with the right may be justified only by a legitimate and 
compelling governmental interest”—which is the test used for privacy 
challenges.93 
The last section of the letter of intent provided a specific legislative 
finding that the Legislature had the ability to prohibit possession of 
firearms by convicted felons or people convicted of crimes of violence.94 
Senator Donley explicitly stated that “the proposed amendment of art. I, 
sec. 19 does not preclude the appropriate exercise of the police power.”95 
He followed this statement by asserting that 
the legislature finds that there is both a legitimate and a 
compelling governmental interest in the enactment and 
enforcement of legislation prohibiting the possession of and 
access to firearms by those who, by their past conduct, have 
demonstrated an unfitness to be entrusted with their 
possession. . . . Specifically the legislature finds a legitimate and 
a compelling governmental interest in the enactment and 
enforcement of legislation limiting access and possession of 
 
 88. Id. at 3032–34, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_single_journal.asp?session=18&date=19940302&beg_page=3019&end_page=
3049&chamber=S. 
 89. Id. at 3032. Because of this resemblance, the senator urged that the 
interpretation of the Second Amendment (that it “does not apply to regulate or 
interfere with private conduct”) is equally applicable to article I, section 19. Id. at 
3032–33. 
 90. Id. at 3033. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id.; see also supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (explaining the two-
tier standard of review system for privacy challenges). 
 94. S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3034. 
 95. Id. 
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arms by convicted felons and those convicted of crimes of 
violence.96 
This letter of intent indicates in a number of ways that the Alaska 
felon-in-possession statute should not be subjected to strict scrutiny. 
First, the document began by noting the comparability of the original 
version of article I, section 19 with the Second Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.97 Such a comparison again emphasizes the import of SJR 
39: to clarify that Alaska had intended to create an individual right to 
bear arms. Second, the Legislature stated its desire for courts reviewing 
article I, section 19 claims to implement the standard of review utilized 
for article I, section 22 claims regarding privacy. This is a flexible 
standard that varies depending on the right involved and the effect that 
the exercise of that right has on other members of the public.98 While 
granting an individual right to bear arms would likely imply that the 
interest is fundamental,99 this still would not prevent the courts from 
utilizing the lower standard of review for convicted felons. In fact, the 
United States Supreme Court has itself carved out an exception to 
heightened scrutiny for convicted felons and other dangerous classes of 
people.100 Moreover, even when the U.S. Constitution closely resembles 
the Alaska Constitution, the Alaska Supreme Court has noted: 
 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 3032. 
 98. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 99. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010) (holding “it 
is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the 
right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our 
system of ordered liberty”). The language “ordered liberty” is very similar to 
that used by the Alaska Supreme Court when determining whether a right is 
fundamental. See Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401–02 (Alaska 1970). Thus, it 
is worth noting that even though McDonald deemed the right to bear arms 
fundamental, it expressly affirmed the notion in District of Columbia v. Heller that 
its holding “did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as 
‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.’” McDonald, 130 S. Ct at 
3047 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)). 
 100. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 nn.26–27 (affirming the constitutionality of 
felon-in-possession laws because they were “presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures” but requiring heightened judicial scrutiny for most other Second 
Amendment challenges by asserting that rational basis review is inappropriate).  
This appears to be the Court’s method of carving out an exception to the 
requirement for heightened scrutiny because the defining feature of rational 
basis review is that laws are presumed valid.  See Lindsay Goldberg, Note, 
District of Columbia v. Heller: Failing to Establish a Standard for the Future, 68 MD. 
L. REV. 889, 911 (2009) (noting that strict scrutiny would work for most Second 
Amendment claims, but there would have to be “exceptions where a more 
deferential standard is appropriate”). 
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We are free, and we are under a duty, to develop 
additional constitutional rights and privileges under our 
Alaska Constitution if we find such fundamental rights and 
privileges to be within the intention and spirit of our local 
constitutional language and to be necessary for the kind of 
civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our 
constitutional heritage.101 
 
The phrase “necessary for the kind of civilized life and ordered 
liberty” provides ample justification for the court to differentiate 
convicted felons from other citizens asserting their article I, section 19 
right. By having committed a felony, regardless of whether it was 
violent in nature, the convicted felon has shown an indifference towards 
maintaining “ordered liberty.”102 
In Alaska, the Senate history reveals a manifest intention to retain 
felon-in-possession restrictions. The Senate could not have been clearer 
when it announced its intent to promote legislation that prevented all 
convicted felons from possessing firearms. Furthermore, when making 
this legislative finding, Senator Donley explicitly disconnected the term 
“convicted felons” from the separate category of “those convicted of 
crimes of violence.”103 That is, the Senate sought to prohibit all persons 
convicted of felonies (including non-violent felonies) from possessing 
firearms. However, such a categorical prohibition would likely lead to 
problems with over-inclusivity under a strict scrutiny review. 
Intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, would require only a 
substantial relationship, which could be met by the State showing a 
general correlation between convicted felons and propensity for future 
criminal activity with firearms.104 In short, the Senate meant to keep 
wide-ranging felon-in-possession restrictions; application of strict 
scrutiny would make it less likely that such broad restrictions would 
 
 101. Baker, 471 P.2d at 401–02. 
 102. See United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(“Irrespective of whether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown 
manifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly complain of the 
limitation on his liberty when his possession of firearms would otherwise 
threaten the security of his fellow citizens.”). This case is especially persuasive 
since the Fifth Circuit had already deemed the Second Amendment to grant an 
individual right by 2004.  See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th 
Cir. 2001). 
 103. See S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3034. 
 104. See United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1171–72 (W.D. Tenn. 
2009) (holding that the federal felon-in-possession statute survives intermediate 
scrutiny); see also United States v. Schultz, No. 1:08-CR-75-TS, 2009 WL 35225, at 
*5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009). 
BLUMBERG_PROOF 4/30/2011  11:43:45 AM 
176 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [28:1 
pass constitutional muster, which in turn suggests that the Legislature 
viewed a lesser level of scrutiny to be appropriate. 
5. House Judiciary Committee 
SJR 39 first appeared in the House Judiciary Committee on April 
16, 1994.105 There were two major issues addressed during this meeting: 
(1) the main purpose of the amendment, which was to clarify that article 
I, section 19 granted an individual right to keep and bear arms; and (2) 
whether to accept a committee substitute version that added the word 
“unreasonably” to the amendment.106 Under that proposal, the 
individual right to keep and bear arms could not be “unreasonably” 
denied by the State. All members of the committee and the witnesses 
who testified appeared to agree on the first issue.107 As noted above, a 
1983 Opinion by the Alaska Attorney General had suggested that article 
I, section 19 protected only a collective right.108 In the 1994 House 
Judiciary meeting, multiple people testified regarding this 1983 
opinion.109 Portia Babcock, as the Senate State Affairs Committee 
legislative aide, explained the effect of this opinion: “[i]t was only after 
this opinion was written in 1983 that they started questioning whether 
they actually had an individual right to bear arms . . . . When that was 
brought into question, people wanted this clarified.”110 Chairman Porter 
seconded this belief and noted “the only law in the books is the attorney 
general’s opinion that says there is no individual right to keep and bear 
arms in the state of Alaska. Consequently. . .we would like to expand 
that to recognize the individual right to keep and bear arms.”111 
Discussion during the House Judiciary meeting centered upon the 
inclusion of the word “unreasonably.”112 Such concerns mirrored the 
 
 105. MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., Apr. 16, 1994, 18th Leg., Tape 94-60, 
Side A at no. 210 (Alaska 1994), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_single_minute.asp?house=H&session=18&comm=JUD&date=19940416&tim
e=1300. 
 106. See generally id. at nos. 252–764. The amended proposal read: “The 
individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be unreasonably denied or 
infringed by the State or a political subdivision of the State.” It also would have 
amended article XV, section 29 to read: “The 1994 amendment of Section 19 of 
Article I does not change the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to the review of 
laws relating to weapons.” Id. 
 107. See id. at nos. 252–807. 
 108. See id. at no. 287 (statement of Portia Babcock). 
 109. See, e.g., id. at no. 764 (statement of Chairman Porter) (reminding 
everyone that “the attorney general’s opinion is in effect until it is superseded by 
law, or challenged”). 
 110. Id. at no. 287 (statement of Portia Babcock). 
 111. Id. at no. 750 (statement of Chairman Porter). 
 112. See generally id. at nos. 508–807. 
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complaints that had been heard in the Senate, where it was feared that if 
the term “unreasonably” were included in the amendment, courts might 
continue using only rational basis review.113 This standard worried 
members of the Committee because they thought it would be too low to 
protect against illegitimate government intrusion into the right they 
were trying to protect.114 Portia Babcock claimed, “they are worried 
about the courts using that word unreasonably to mean any law that has 
any positive justification [should be upheld], rather than [requiring 
proof of] a compelling governmental interest” to uphold a law that 
limits the right.115 Representative Phillips repeated the fear about 
releasing an amendment with the potential for reasonableness review 
when she noted that she “did not agree that the people of Alaska would 
buy into adding the word ‘unreasonably’ or the level of judicial scrutiny 
as part of our constitutional statement on the right to bear arms.”116 This 
critical statement perfectly encapsulates why the other versions of SJR 39 
were repeatedly shot down. As Representative Phillips pointed out, the 
omission resulted from legislators’ conclusions that their constituents 
might not accept the passage of a bill that had any wording related to a 
standard of review.117 
Witnesses also expressly declared their opposition to the word 
“unreasonably.”118 Conspicuously absent from any of their comments, 
though, was any reference to a form of strict scrutiny. The voters’ main 
concern regarding this proposal was that it would ensure an individual 
 
 113. See McCracken v. State, 743 P.2d 382, 384 (Alaska Ct. App 1987) (holding 
§ 11.61.200(b) constitutional on equal protection grounds because the “statute is 
a reasonable and rational attempt to achieve the statutory goal. Nothing more is 
required.”). This standard exemplifies rational basis review and its extreme 
judicial deference, which legislators and citizens alike wanted to avoid for 
constitutional analysis under article I, section 19. 
 114. See MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 105, at no. 508 
(statement of Portia Babcock). 
 115. Id. 
 116. MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., Apr. 18, 1994, 18th Leg., Tape 94-61, 
Side B at no. 000 (Alaska 1994) available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_single_minute.asp?ch=H&beg_line=1071&end_line=1344&session=18&com
m=JUD&date=19940418&time=1300 (statement of Representative Phillips). 
 117. Id.; see also MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 105, at no. 440 
(statement of Portia Babcock).  Regarding including standard of review in the 
amendment, Babcock stated: “People who are going in to vote on this would 
have no idea what this means.” Id. This is an excellent point by Ms. Babcock and 
perfectly encapsulates why the courts are ultimately responsible for choosing the 
level of scrutiny to apply to laws that are facing constitutional challenges. 
 118. See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 105, at no. 200 
(statement of Konrad Schaad) (stating that “he comes in contact with hundreds 
of people. Of those people, nobody is in opposition to the bill, but they do 
oppose the term ‘unreasonably.’”). 
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right to bear arms and that if adopted, it could not be restricted by 
judges who exercised wide latitude under the term “unreasonably.” 
Such concerns could have been alleviated through the use of the 
“close and substantial relationship” test for felon-in-possession laws. 
These restrictions are not rubber-stamped by the judiciary but must 
demonstrate a substantial relationship to a legitimate government 
interest.119 Indeed, this standard—as opposed to strict scrutiny—most 
closely resembles the one described by legislators through the legislative 
history regarding felon-in-possession restrictions. 
After hearing from witnesses, the committee ended the meeting 
and scheduled a closed meeting for April 18.120 Chairman Porter decided 
to propose his substitute bill that included the term “unreasonably” 
even though he knowingly acknowledged the public’s disagreement 
with it.121 The substitute bill passed122 and then went to the House 
Finance Committee for review. 
6. House Finance Committee 
Representative Porter’s proposal and SJR 39 were addressed in the 
House Finance Committee on April 30, 1994.123 Portia Babcock opened 
the proceedings by remarking on the status of article I, section 19: 
“[c]urrent language is ambiguous, whereas, several attempts have been 
made in past Legislature[s] to clarify the right of the ‘individual’ citizen 
to own a firearm.”124 Next, Representative Porter testified in favor of the 
substitute version that contained the word “unreasonably.”125 He noted 
that it was safer to include this phrase and that opponents were overly 
worried about the effect of this word.126 
Mr. Guaneli, the Assistant Attorney General at the time, followed 
and mentioned that “the Alaska Supreme Court uses a sliding scale of 
scrutiny which applies to the Constitution and state laws for protection 
 
 119. See, e.g., Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 120. MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 105, at no. 675. 
 121. MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 116, at no. 129 (statement 
of Chairman Porter). 
 122. Id. 
 123. MINUTES OF THE H. FIN. COMM., Apr. 30, 1994, 18th Leg., Tape 94-149, Side 
1, at nos. 0–end (Alaska 1994), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_single_minute.asp?house=H&session=18&comm=FIN&date=19940430&tim
e=1350. 
 124. Id. (statement of Portia Babcock). 
 125. Id. at no. 2 (statement of Representative Brian Porter). 
 126. Id. Representative Porter referenced the term “unreasonable” as used in 
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. He claimed that courts had 
properly applied protections to the right guaranteed by this Amendment even 
though it emphasized the term “unreasonable.”  Id. at nos. 2, 7–8. 
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challenges.”127 Guaneli then noted that rational basis is at the lower end 
of the scale and that he “thought the firearm laws would fall in the 
lower end category and that the amendment would increase the level of 
scrutiny the Courts would apply to gun laws.”128 
At the hearing, Representative Sean Parnell, now the Alaska 
Governor, “questioned the amendment to SJR 39 which would change 
the level of judicial scrutiny [pertaining] to laws relating to 
weapons.’”129 As a result of a lengthy exchange with Guaneli regarding 
potential effects on firearm regulations under rational basis review, 
Representative Parnell voted to support the Senate version of SJR 39.130 
Again, though, this does not signify a mandate to utilize strict scrutiny 
for all firearm restrictions (including felon-in-possession restrictions) but 
rather demonstrates legislators’ worries about the leniency of rational 
basis or reasonableness review. 
After brief discussion, the committee then approved SJR 39 as it 
was written in the Senate by a vote of six to two.131 
7. House Floor 
The final stop in the legislative process for SJR 39 was a vote on the 
House floor. On May 2, 1994, Representative Porter made one last effort 
to insert the word “unreasonable” into the language of the 
amendment.132 The suggested change was again voted down, but this 
time the vote was a fairly close twenty-four to fifteen.133 After two 
unrelated proposals by Representative John Davies were rejected, the 
House scheduled a vote on SJR 39 for the following day.134 On May 3, 
1994, the full House voted thirty-three to four in favor of passage.135 
Representative Porter made yet another effort to soften the effect of 
SJR 39 by submitting a letter of intent for the proposal.136 The letter of 
intent explained that the new right would not be guaranteed “when the 
legislature has determined that such conduct is contrary to the public 
 
 127. Id. at no. 2 (statement of Dean Guaneli). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at no. 2 (statement of Representative Parnell). 
 130. See id. at nos. 2–3. 
 131. Id. at no. 3. 
 132. 1994 H.R. JOURNAL 3936–37, 18th Leg., 2d. Sess. (Alaska 1994), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_journal.asp?session=18&date=1
9940502&beg_page=3899&end_page=3945&chamber=H. 
 133. Id. at 3937. 
 134. Id. at 3939–40. 
 135. Id. at 3972–73, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_single_journal.asp?session=18&date=19940503&beg_page=3947&end_page=
3985&chamber=H. 
 136. Id. at 3973. 
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interest.”137 This proposed standard is extraordinarily vague and would 
create more questions than answers. Fittingly, the House rejected this 
letter of intent by a vote of twenty-three to fourteen.138 After voting 
down the letter of intent, Representative Navarre moved for 
reconsideration.139 The last vote on SJR 39 was held on May 4, 1994, and 
it passed convincingly by a tally of thirty-six to three.140 
C. 1994 Election Pamphlet 
SJR 39 was presented to the voters as Ballot Measure No. 1 in the 
1994 general election.141 The proposal was accompanied by a position 
statement from supporters of the proposal, a statement by people in 
opposition to the proposal, and a neutral statement provided by the 
Legislative Affairs Agency.142 As Judge Mannheimer appropriately 
pointed out, none of the three statements contained any mention of strict 
scrutiny or any discussion of a change to the level of judicial scrutiny to 
be applied to firearm restrictions.143 He also noted the statement by the 
Legislative Affairs Agency, which read: “This measure amends the state 
constitution by adding a specific reference to the individual right to 
keep and bear arms.”144 There is nothing to suggest that voters had any 
idea that the ballot implicated the standard of review, and thus, it is 
apparent that voters gave their approval only to the specification of the 
individual right. In short, the neutral position statement provided by the 
governmental agency informed the voters of the critical issue they were 
deciding: whether the Alaska Constitution should guarantee an 
individual right to keep and bear arms. The voters believed it should, 
and the amendment passed with 72.7% of the vote.145 
Furthermore, the statement in support of the amendment 
specifically noted that convicted felons would be excluded from 
exercising the right.146 It consistently referred to “law-abiding citizen” 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 3973–74. 
 139. Id. at 3974. 
 140. Id. at 3991–92, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_single_journal.asp?session=18&date=19940504&beg_page=3987&end_page=
4013&chamber=H. 
 141. ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, ALASKA 1994 OFFICIAL ELECTION PAMPHLET B-
20 (1994). 
 142. See id. 
 143. Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 583–84 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009) 
(Mannheimer, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. at 584 (quoting ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 141). 
 145. See 1994 General Election Official Results, supra note 1. 
 146. ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 141. Based on the supporter’s 
statement in the election pamphlet, one could think that voters desired not to 
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when describing who would be able to benefit from the new right.147 It 
also explicitly stated that “YES on #1 will NOT stop or restrict public 
safety officials from punishing or prohibiting the possession of arms by 
those who misuse arms, nor does it protect criminals or delinquents who 
misuse arms. These individuals would be excluded from enjoyment of 
this right.”148 
D. Case Law Interpreting 1994 Amendment 
1. Gibson v. State 
The Alaska Court of Appeal’s first application of the 1994 
amendment came in 1997 in Gibson v. State.149 In Gibson, the defendant 
was seen armed with an AK-47 rifle while intoxicated on his property.150 
He was charged with possessing a firearm while intoxicated under 
section 11.61.210(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes.151 He pled no contest but 
preserved the right to argue on appeal that the statute was 
unconstitutional when applied to people intoxicated on their own 
property.152 The Alaska Court of Appeals first determined whether 
section 11.61.210(a)(1) was constitutional under article I, section 19.153 
The court reviewed the legislative history and voter pamphlet associated 
with the 1994 amendment to determine the contours of the newly 
created individual right.154 The court noted that the legislative history 
was full of statements that indicated the amendment should not affect 
any current regulations regarding firearms.155 Additionally, the court 
relied heavily upon the advocates’ statement, which was found in the 
election pamphlet and favored upholding the law.156 Taking these 
 
invalidate firearm restrictions. Judge Mannheimer, though, accurately observed 
that this is an imperfect assumption since some voters may have wanted to pass 
the amendment regardless. See Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 589 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2009) (Mannheimer, J., dissenting). But cf. Hickel v. Halford, 872 P.2d 171, 
178 n.12 (Alaska 1994) (holding that the voter “pamphlet is an authoritative 
source of the voters’ common understanding of section 17”). In Hickel, the court 
noted that the statement in support of the amendment resulted in a “clear” 
understanding of a term in the constitution when viewed in connection with the 
language in the provision. Id. at 178. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 930 P.2d 1300 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 150. Id. at 1301. 
 151. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.210(a)(1) (2010). 
 152. See Gibson, 930 P.2d at 1300–01. 
 153. See id. at 1301. 
 154. See id. at 1301–02. 
 155. Id. at 1301. 
 156. Id. at 1302. According to the court, the advocates’ statement announced 
specifically that “a ‘yes’ vote would NOT overturn or invalidate state laws 
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factors into consideration, the court concluded that the amendment was 
not intended to overturn the law regulating possession of firearms while 
intoxicated.157 
The court then considered whether the defendant was entitled to 
special constitutional protection because he was on his own property 
when found by the police.158 The defendant argued that “the individual 
right to bear arms and the previously adopted state constitutional right 
to privacy combine to create special constitutional protection for 
possession of firearms in the home.”159 The court noted that the right to 
bear arms is not absolute and neither is the right to privacy.160 Because 
the right to privacy was implicated, the court applied the sliding scale 
test it had previously used when addressing article I, section 22.161 As 
noted earlier, the Senate’s letter of intent concerning SJR 39 had also 
embraced the idea that courts use the same standard in “right to bear 
arms” cases as was used in “right to privacy” cases.162 Here, the court 
correctly applied the privacy test; thus, the right “may be restricted if the 
restriction bears a close and substantial relationship to a legitimate 
governmental interest.”163 
Even though the court did not expressly recognize that there may 
have been a fundamental right to bear arms in Alaska after 1994, the 
court used the proper test because that fundamental right should not 
extend to possessing firearms while intoxicated. It is analogous to the 
supreme court’s rationale in Ravin v. State,164 which held that even 
though Alaskans enjoy a fundamental right to privacy in their homes, 
certain activities are not entitled to “fundamental” stature when they 
may “interfere[] in a serious manner with the health, safety, rights and 
privileges of others or with the public welfare.”165 The court in Gibson 
concluded that the duty to defend the health and welfare of its citizens is 
one of the most, if not the most, legitimate governmental interests the 
state could use.166 The court then documented several instances of harm 
 
restricting access or possession of arms by . . . those under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol.” Id. 
 157. Id. at 1302–03. 
 158. Id. at 1301–02. 
 159. Id. at 1302. Alaska explicitly guarantees a right to privacy. See ALASKA 
CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 160. Gibson, 930 P.2d at 1302. 
 161. Id. 
 162. S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3032–34. 
 163. Gibson, 930 P.2d at 1302 (citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 
1975)). 
 164. 537 P.2d 494. 
 165. Id. at 504. 
 166. Gibson, 930 P.2d at 1302. 
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caused by intoxicated persons in possession of firearms.167 Therefore, it 
upheld the statute because prohibiting the “possession of firearms while 
intoxicated bears a close and substantial relationship to the state’s 
legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.”168 
However, in Wilson, Judge Mannheimer asserted in dissent that the 
Gibson court had erred when it determined that the 1994 amendment 
allowed the Legislature to enact firearms restrictions subject to a test of 
reasonableness rather than strict scrutiny.169 In Gibson, though, the court 
never mentioned a standard of mere reasonableness. The closest that it 
got to that low standard was noting that the state remained able to pass 
regulations on firearms when “there is a significant risk” that the people 
being denied use of firearms would have wielded them in a “criminal or 
dangerous fashion.”170 This statement resembles the intermediate 
scrutiny-type approach that tries to determine whether a law bears a 
close and substantial relationship to a legitimate government interest. 
The court’s main concern in Ravin was that behavior inside the home, 
even though constitutionally fundamentally protected, had to give way 
to public welfare requirements when the activity was not one that 
society valued.171 Here, it is likely that society would not value the right 
to bear arms as strongly for an intoxicated man (as opposed to a sober 
one) because as history has demonstrated, the intoxicated man presents 
a significant risk of using the firearm in a dangerous fashion.172 This 
type of analysis mirrors that conducted by the court in Gibson while 
reviewing the defendant’s firearm challenge under article 1, section 22. 
Had it been a test of mere reasonableness, the court would have used 
terms such as “rationally related” or “reasonably related” to a 
governmental interest. 
As Judge Mannheimer points out in his dissent in Wilson, the court 
in Gibson was incorrect when it stated “the history of the proposed 
amendment contains no indications” of intent to apply strict scrutiny.173 
As discussed above, there was evidence in the legislative history 
revealing a desire to implement a heightened level of scrutiny to firearm 
 
 167. Id. (giving examples that included situations where an intoxicated man 
used a firearm inside his house and killed his sister who was outside the front 
door and where a man shot and killed his “drinking companion after an 
argument” in his home). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 570–71 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009) 
(Mannheimer, J., dissenting). 
 170. Gibson, 930 P.2d at 1301. 
 171. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504. 
 172. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Wilson, 207 P.3d at 586 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting); Gibson, 930 P.2d 
at 1302. 
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regulations. Those examples, though, demonstrated both the 
Legislature’s general aversion to the basic reasonableness test and its 
aversion to strict scrutiny for felon-in-possession statutes. As seen 
throughout the legislative history—including the Senate’s letter of 
intent—the legislators who consistently utilized the term “compelling 
state interest” made sure to include a statement that supported the 
continued legitimacy of felon-in-possession laws.174 Therefore, it is likely 
the legislators intended to institute an intermediate level of scrutiny 
rather than strict scrutiny for certain dangerous classes of citizens. In 
short, the Gibson court ultimately set good precedent in upholding the 
constitutionality of a restriction barring intoxicated people from 
possessing firearms. 
The court in Gibson did not specifically announce a standard of 
review for evaluating firearm restrictions after the 1994 amendment, but 
it did lay the foundation for future decisions to rely on the “close and 
substantial” relationship test when reviewing challenges to such 
restrictions. As will be seen in the following cases, however, the court 
elected to forego this route. 
2. Morgan v. State 
Six months after Gibson was decided, the court heard Morgan v. 
State,175 an appeal questioning the constitutionality of section 
11.61.200(a)(10) of the Alaska Statutes.176 This section prohibits a person 
from “resid[ing] in a dwelling knowing that there is a firearm capable of 
being concealed on one’s person or a prohibited weapon in the dwelling 
if the person has been convicted of a felony.”177 In Morgan, the defendant 
challenged his conviction on multiple grounds, including whether 
section 11.61.200(a)(10) of the Alaska Statutes was invalidated after the 
passage of the 1994 amendment to article I, section 19.178 In an opinion 
authored by Judge Mannheimer, the court quickly dismissed the 
 
 174. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3032–34. While the Legislature 
cannot ratify its own laws as constitutional, it is important for courts to view the 
Legislature’s statements in order to apply its independent judgment. Hickel v. 
Halford, 872 P.2d 171, 176–77 (Alaska 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(“Constitutional provisions should be given a reasonable and practical 
interpretation in accordance with common sense. The court should look to the 
plain meaning and purpose of the provision and the intent of the framers. . . . 
[T]he court must look to the meaning that the voters would have placed on its 
provisions.”). 
 175. 943 P.2d 1208 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 176. See id. at 1209. 
 177. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(a)(10) (2010). 
 178. Morgan, 943 P.2d at 1209. 
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defendant’s claim based on the analysis in Gibson.179 But instead of 
entrenching the “close and substantial relationship” standard used in 
Gibson, the court continued to use an ambiguous test that looks to 
determine when “there is a significant risk that [convicted felons] will 
use those firearms in a criminal or dangerous fashion.”180 
3. Demars v. State181 
In 1987, DeMars was convicted of a felony for leaving the scene of 
an accident.182 Nine years later, he was visiting another person’s home 
when the police were alerted that he possessed a handgun.183 DeMars 
was charged with being a felon in possession of a concealable firearm.184 
In 1999, DeMars appealed his conviction based on his claim that the 1994 
amendment created doubt as to the constitutionality of section 
11.61.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes.185 The court relied upon the 
analysis in Gibson but also emphasized that the legislative history and 
election pamphlet clearly exemplified a consensus that the 1994 
amendment would not affect laws regulating felons in possession of 
concealable firearms.186 Once again, the court employed the test looking 
for a “significant risk” that the firearms will be used “in a criminal or 
dangerous fashion.” Based on these findings, the court rejected DeMars’ 
challenge based on the 1994 amendment.187 
II. STARE DECISIS 
In his concurrence in Wilson v. State, Judge Stewart applied the 
principle of stare decisis to bolster the court’s conclusions.188 In Alaska, 
stare decisis mandates that a court “should overrule a prior decision 
only when ‘clearly convinced [that] the rule was originally erroneous or 
is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good 
 
 179. Id. at 1212. 
 180. Id. (quoting Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1301 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)). 
 181. Nos. A-7002, 4100, 1999 WL 652444 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1999). 
Although this is an unpublished decision that is not legally binding, it is being 
used to fully articulate the history of the court’s interpretation of the 1994 
amendment, especially since it regards the same law at issue in Wilson. 
 182. Id. at *1. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at *2. DeMars also challenged his conviction on equal protection 
grounds, mistake-of-law defense, and the prohibition on ex post facto laws. 
None of these other defenses were applicable to the 1994 amendment. Id. at *2–3. 
 186. Id. at *2. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 569–70 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009) (Stewart, 
J., concurring). 
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than harm would result from a departure from precedent.’”189 Judge 
Stewart issued conclusory statements that each prong was satisfied, but 
they should be elaborated upon to resolve any doubts. 
First, the original ruling in Gibson is not erroneous. While the court 
could have further developed its analysis by including more legislative 
history, its ultimate ruling was correct.190 Throughout the legislative 
history, there are instances in which legislators specifically state that 
certain restrictions on firearms would not be invalidated if the 1994 
amendment passed.191 Furthermore, the court’s reliance on the election 
pamphlet was not clearly erroneous,192 and the election pamphlet 
mirrored the legislative history in stating that the amendment would not 
invalidate current firearm regulations regarding felons.193 Moreover, 
Judge Stewart was correct in focusing on the intent of the voters. The 
Alaska Supreme Court has noted, “A constitutional provision, however, 
must be ratified by the voters, and it is therefore also necessary to look 
to the meaning that the voters would have placed on its provisions.”194 
As an example, in State v. Lewis, the court had observed that “voters 
were probably not privy to the comments of the delegates.”195 However, 
the court then noted that the voters were clearly informed of the 
provision’s purpose by the “unambiguous language” of a widely 
distributed report.196 Here, on the other hand, the voters were in the 
dark on the Legislature’s debates regarding the proposed constitutional 
amendment. All they received was a voter pamphlet with a supporting 
statement, opposition statement, and the neutral statement of the 
 
 189. Id. at 570 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 
610 (Alaska 1986)). 
 190. Additionally, Gibson gave future courts the opportunity to apply 
heightened scrutiny, but in their independent judgment, the court chose to carry 
forward with the murkier standard looking for “significant risks” of use in a 
“criminal and dangerous fashion.” 
 191. See supra Part I.B. 
 192. Before the Senate Finance Committee, Dean Guaneli testified that “[t]he 
courts look largely at language used in voter pamphlets and the history behind the 
legislation” when trying to determine the intent of an amendment. MINUTES OF 
THE S. FIN. COMM., supra note 42 (emphasis added) (statement of Dean J. 
Guaneli). This demonstrates that legislators were on notice that the election 
pamphlet was important. Therefore, if the standard of review was important, 
they would have made sure it got in the pamphlet, or at least prevented such 
bold statements like the advocates’ from appearing on the ballot. See Hickel v. 
Halford, 872 P.2d 171, 176–77 (Alaska 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(“[T]he court must look to the meaning that the voters would have placed on 
[the constitutional] provisions.”). 
 193. ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 141. 
 194. State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 637 (Alaska 1977). 
 195. Id. at 638. 
 196. Id. 
BLUMBERG_PROOF 4/30/2011  11:43:45 AM 
2011 FELON-IN-POSSESSION RESTRICTIONS 187 
Legislative Affairs Agency.197 Since none of these statements mentioned 
anything about the standard of review, it would be difficult to ascribe 
any intent to the voters other than the clarification of an individual 
right.198 
Changed circumstances are the other reason why a prior case can 
be overturned. But there have been no significant events since 1994 that 
would qualify as changed circumstances to support overturning Gibson. 
The United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Heller and McDonald 
would be the only significant developments that could be considered to 
have changed circumstances, but those decisions favor upholding 
Gibson. When acknowledging an individual right to bear arms for the 
first time, the majority opinion in Heller specifically asserted that special 
classifications could still be made to prohibit certain people from 
possessing firearms.199 Included in this list was the ability to proscribe 
convicted felons from possessing firearms.200 Indeed, the Court’s 
language in Heller mirrors that seen in the legislative history of SJR 39, 
where legislators consistently avowed that the 1994 amendment would 
not apply to felon-in-possession statutes.201 
Lastly, even if one of the two preceding conditions had been met, 
there is simply no legitimate argument that “more good than harm” 
would come from overturning Gibson. Overturning Gibson would only 
create a rash of challenges to the very laws that the Legislature 
specifically noted it did not want to invalidate. By opening these 
floodgates, the court would then be able to utilize strict scrutiny in a 
manner directly adverse to the intent of both the Legislature and the 
general public. This option simply cannot be viewed as a possibility that 
would create “more good than harm.” 
CONCLUSION 
It would have been easier for the courts if the Alaska Legislature 
had adopted a proposal that clearly stated the intended level of judicial 
review and any categorical exceptions to article I, section 19. This way, 
 
 197. ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 141. 
 198. See supra note 146.  
 199. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625–27 (2008); see also id. at 
627 n.26 (stating “our list does not purport to be exhaustive”); cf. Brannon P. 
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower Courts and the 
New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 1245, 1248 (2009) (explaining 
the “Heller safe harbor” and the categories the Court specifically mentioned as 
unaffected by their decision). 
 200. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 201. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3034. 
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the courts would have been assured that the general public was voting 
based on both the individual right and the standard of review. 
However, the main concern of Alaskans—and accordingly the main 
concern of the Alaska Legislature—in 1994 was to enact an amendment 
quickly that would cement article I, section 19 as guaranteeing an 
individual right to keep and bear arms. After weighing all of their 
options, legislators made a decision that the most likely way to achieve 
this end was to add one sentence clearly and specifically stating that 
there was an individual right for the citizens of Alaska to bear arms. 
Legislators drafted their language accordingly, and the amendment 
passed. 
The recurring theme throughout the legislative history concerning 
the amendment was the need to clarify that article I, section 19 protected 
an individual right. The secondary issue regarding standard of review 
has also now come to an appropriate result. The legislators who 
commented on SJR 39 consistently noted that felon-in-possession 
statutes should not be affected by the amendment. This straightforward 
intent could not reliably be effected if strict scrutiny applied to 
challenges under section 11.61.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes. The 
judicial and legislative branches do not always take the same path in 
their decision-making. And indeed, they often have disagreements over 
multiple aspects of the other’s performance.202 In Wilson, though, the 
majority reached a conclusion that matched the legislative history by 
refusing to apply strict scrutiny to Alaska’s felon-in-possession statutes. 
 
 
 202. See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 116, at no. 129 
(statement of Representative Phillips) (expressing distrust of the judicial branch 
and incredulity at some of its rulings). 
